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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
Case No. 920853-CA
Priority No. 2

COREY LYNN BROOKS,
Defendant.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes and constitutional provisions
are copied in Appendix 1 to this brief:
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 10
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII section 1
United States Constitution, Amendment VI
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV
Utah Code Ann. section 76-1-601
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-202
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-203
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-302
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-8
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-15
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 25
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18
Utah Rule of Evidence 606.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The time for the trial court to resolve juror
Barber's incompetence was during the voir dire and the place for
the trial court to resolve Mr. Barber's incompetence was on the
record.

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18; Constitution of

Utah, Article VIII section 1.

Well established law regarding the

need for fair jury trials counsels against condoning the post-

oath, off-the-record discussion of a juror's qualifications
between the juror and the judge.
The trial court failed in his duty under Utah law to
conduct an adequate voir dire to rebut the inference of bias
attaching to the similar-crime-victim prospective jurors.

Trial

counsel did not request an adequate voir dire, but allowed two
similar-crime-victim jurors to be seated on Mr. Brooks' jury, and
used one of Mr. Brooks' peremptory challenges to remove a
similar-crime-victim juror.

This Court should reverse Mr.

Brooks' convictions and order a new trial wherein the rudimentary
law governing jury selection is applied.
Because the jury did not have to find that Mr.
Brooks committed any voluntary bodily movement in convicting him
of aggravated burglary that was not encompassed in the elements
of aggravated robbery, Mr. Brooks' conviction for aggravated
burglary should be stricken.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE JURY SELECTION ERRORS
REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL.
A. THE BARBER AFFIDAVIT DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR A NEW TRIAL.
In response to Mr. Brooks' argument that he was
denied his rights to a fair trial because juror Barber was
incompetent to serve on his jury, the State's brief includes and
relies on an ex parte affidavit which is not part of the record
on appeal.

The State has also filed a separate contingent motion
2

to include the affidavit in the record.
16, Appendix III.

Brief of appellee at 7,

This Court should reject the affidavit and

strike the State's brief, admonishing the State that it is not
above the law that matters included in appellate briefs which are
not part of the record presented in the trial court will not be
considered by the appellate courts.

E.g. Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure 11 and 25; Watkins v. Simonds,3 85 P.2d 154 (Utah 1963).
Insofar as the affidavit seeks to shore up the
verdict by addressing the internal deliberative process, the
affidavit is inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 606.
State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988).

See

Cf. e.g. Tanner v.

United States, 483 U.S. 107, 126 (1987).
Rather than obviating error, the ex parte affidavit
calls into question the fundamental fairness of Mr. Brooks' jury
trial.
record.

Mr. Brooks was supposed to have been tried in a court of
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII section 1.

The fact

that the trial court apparently approached one of the jurors off
the record is sufficient basis for the reversal of Mr. Brooks'
conviction.

See Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah App.

1989)(failure to record proceedings justifies reversal).
In addition to demonstrating a violation of Mr.
Brooks' right to be tried in a court of record, the affidavit
raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to Mr. Brooks
stemming from the trial court's discussion of personal matters
bearing on the case with the juror.

See State v. Pike, 712 P.2d

277 (Utah 1985)(citing Constitution of Utah, Article I section
3

10, United States Constitution, Amendments VI and XIV; holding
that a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises from anything
more than incidental contact between jurors and court personnel);
Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224 (Utah App. 1990)(explaining
bases for the presumption: taint from contact is difficult to
prove, contact gives rise to appearance of impropriety).
The affidavit is insufficient to rebut the prejudice
it raises.

Nowhere in the affidavit is there any indication that

Mr. Barber was not influenced by the off-the-record encounter
with the judge.

Nor could Mr. Barber's opinion as to the impact

of the encounter rebut the presumption of prejudice.

See State

v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987)("the denial by the juror
that he had been influenced by the encounter was not enough to
overcome the presumption of prejudice.11) .
Even if the affidavit were properly in the record,
it would not obviate the errors encompassed in seating Mr. Barber
on Mr. Brooks' jury.

The affidavit merely opines that Mr. Barber

was not distracted from his service after he had made
arrangements for his wife after the trial had begun, and does
nothing to establish that Mr. Barber's service prior to the
arrangements was adequate.

The affidavit opines that Mr. Barber

was not distracted by his need to take his wife to therapy
because he had postponed her treatments.

This does not resolve

the bias reflected in his voir dire with the judge, wherein the
judge asked him if the treatment schedule could be changed to fit
the recesses in the trial, and wherein Mr. Barber maintained, "I
4

am not sure that I could devote my undivided attention to the
case under the circumstances." (T2 29-31).

Mr. Barber's

assessment of the competency of his service is insufficient;
jurors are not qualified to assess their own competency.

State

v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1992)("This court has
consistently held that the trial court, not the juror, must
determine a juror's qualifications.").
Mr. Brooks agrees with the State that juror bias and
juror incompetence are separate issues.

Compare brief of

appellant at 7 ("juror competency is separate issue from juror
impartiality.") with brief of appellee at 14 ("Competence does
not, as defendant seems to argue, deal with juror 'bias.'").
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(14) allows for challenges
for cause in the event of juror bias or incompetence, and applies
in this case wherein Mr. Barber's distraction relating to his
wife's injury, or "mental disability" resulted in his inability
to act "without prejudice to the substantial rights" of Mr.
Brooks to a competent jury.
The State seeks to minimize Mr. Barber's
incompetence, stating, "Barber only stated that he had a schedule
conflict, posed by his wife's physical therapy appointments, that
might cause him to be less than fully attentive at trial (R.
270)."

Brief of appellee at 14. The record demonstrates that

Mr. Barber's concerns were more than a mere scheduling conflict.
It was in response to the court's question about the ability to
provide satisfactory jury service that Mr. Barber indicated under
5

oath that his wife had had knee surgery and that he had to take
her to therapy.

When the court asked if other arrangements could

be made, Mr. Barber maintained that he had been unable to arrange
to have someone else take her to therapy.

When the court asked

Mr. Barber if he was trying to make other arrangements, Mr.
Barber did not relent, but indicated, "Well, she has until - - a
week from today she goes in to the doctor to see if the therapy
is successful."

The court asked again if other arrangements

could be made, and Mr. Barber told the court, "I don't have
anyone I could trust with her."

The court asked if Mr. Barber

had tried to reschedule the therapy and Mr. Barber said that he
had not.

The court informed Mr. Barber about the court's normal

recess schedule, and asked if Mr. Barber could work with that
schedule.

Mr. Barber stated, "I am not sure that I could devote

my undivided attention to the case under the circumstances."
(T2. 29-31).
The State argues that because Mr. Barber's
disability did not indicate a bias to either side, the court
"could not possibly predict which party would be prejudiced by
the distraction" and that the trial court could fairly assume
that the prejudice stemming from the disability would be borne
equally between the parties, and allow Mr. Barber to serve on the
jury.

Brief of appellee at 15.

The fact that a juror's lack of

qualification may harm both parties does not absolve the trial
court of his responsibility to see that the jury seated comports
with statutory and constitutional requirements.
6

Mr. Barber's

service prejudiced Mr. Brooks' substantial constitutional right
to a competent jury.

E.g. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,

126 (1987) .
The State argues that Mr. Barber's incompetence
falls under Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-15, which allows jurors
to be excused on the grounds of hardship.

The State argues that

the hardship statute constitutes a statutory exemption from
service, and argues that as an exemption, the hardship privilege
must be raised by the prospective juror.

Brief of appellee at 16

(citing Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(h)).

The hardship

statute does not constitute a statutory exemption from jury
service, but merely gives trial courts the discretion to excuse
jurors.

Because Mr. Brooks has a right to a mentally competent

jury, which was compromised by Mr. Barber's service, Mr. Brooks
has standing to raise the issue.
The Barber affidavit, recording the trial court's
off-the-record efforts to correct the errors of seating Mr.
Barber, demonstrates that it should have been plain to the trial
court during the voir dire that Mr. Barber was not competent to
serve, and that trial counsel was objectively deficient in
failing to challenge juror Barber.

This Court should reverse Mr.

Brooks' conviction and order a new trial.
B. THE SERVICE OF JURORS PIKE AND HEAP REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL.
Mr. Brooks is arguing that the trial court committed
plain error, and that trial counsel was constitutionally
deficient because jurors Pike and Heap were seated on the jury in
7

the absence of voir dire concerning their past victimization of
the crimes at issue in this case.

In response, the State posits

that the trial court acted within his discretion in protecting
juror privacy from probing on the topic.
17-18.

Brief of appellee at

The State argues similarly that trial counsel should be

presumed to have made a tactical choice to cater to the jurors'
privacy in failing to demand voir dire on the jurors'
victimization.

Brief of appellee at 29-30.

The State's

arguments overlook the trial court's duty to see to it that the
voir dire of prospective jurors is constitutionally adequate,
e.g., State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992), and
trial counsel's duties to investigate before making tactical
choices, e.g. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-691
(1984).

When a defendant's right to an impartial jury clashes

with a prospective juror's right to privacy, the defendant's
right must prevail, particularly in light of the availability of
in camera voir dire.

E.g. State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah

1984) .
The State's argument that the trial court and trial
counsel were properly protecting the privacy of jurors Pike and
Heap in failing to probe their presumptive prejudice is
nonsensical particularly on this record, wherein the trial court
and trial counsel did investigate similar biases with other
prospective jurors (T2 75-85).
The State argues that the trial court acted within
his discretion in inquiring into prior crimes experience only
8

with those jurors who had been victims of violent assaultive
conduct, and that the court's failure to inquire into Mi

I »j ke's

leap's pi:ioi crimes experience is justified because they
were merely burglarized but not directly assaulted.
appellee at 19.

Brief of

Because the trial court i i ri nor ask jurors Pike

and Heap about their prior victimizations, it cannot be said that
they were not "direct" victims or victims of violence or assault.
More importantly, the trial court' s cii lty t> : :t : ebi it tl le :I nference
of bias attaching to similar-crime-victim jurors applies to all
prospective jurors with similar crimes experience, not just to
"direct" victims or violev

:

ne vict

..

E.g. State v. Wooley,

tilU P.2d 440 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 65 (Utah 1991).
The State argues that the voir dire of jurors Pike
and H^.-ir. wa s adeqi i-ate because neither jui co indicated a bias when
the trial court asked the potential jurors if there was anything
that might cause them to be biased.
The

Brief of appellee at 19.
competent ;. :> assess their

own biases, and that it is the duty of the trial court to
sufficiently probe juror biases to rebut presumptive biases and
to al3 >
challenges.

gent exercise of peremptory and for-cause
See opening brief of appellant at 5-7, 13-16.
The State argues that there should be no inference

o £ b :I a s a 11 a c h i i lg t • ::: p r o s p e c t: j v e j u r o i s wl ic 1 I a ' e s u ffered cri me s
similar to those to be tried, noting that the Utah Legislature
has stated its intention to allow all qualified citizens
as ]umr \

Vhe

serve

tale argues that the inference of bias attaching
9

to similar-crime-victim jurors involves judicial circumvention of
the intention of the legislature, and therefore violates the
doctrine of separation of governmental powers.
at 20.

Brief of appellee

The legislature has expressly and appropriately placed

the burden on the courts to insure that constitutional rights to
impartial juries are respected.
46-8.

E.g. Utah Code Ann. section 78-

The Utah Courts' well-established tradition of recognizing

a rebuttable inference of bias attaching to similar-crime-victim
jurors is consistent with this responsibility, and in no way
infringes on prospective jurors7 right to participate in the jury
system if they are qualified to do so.
C. THE USE OF A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO REMOVE JUROR GEURTS, IN
THE ABSENCE OF SUFFICIENT VOIR DIRE, CALLS FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Mr. Brooks is arguing that prospective juror Geurts
should have been removed for cause, or examined by the trial
court until the inference of bias attaching to her, as a victim
of crimes similar to those at issue here.

He is also arguing

that the use of his peremptory challenge to remove this juror was
reversible error.

Mr. Brooks is asserting the plain error and

ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines in addressing this
issue.

In response, the State argues that no obvious error

occurred because juror Geurts may have been biased against the
prosecution because her husband was a defense witness in a
separate trial tried by Mr. Brooks' prosecutor.

The State also

notes that juror Geurts shared the same religious affiliation
with the prosecutor.

Ms. Geurts' husband's prior participation

in another case, and Ms. Geurts' religious affiliation have
10

nothing to do with the trial court's duties to investigate the
inference of bias attaching to jurors ; 1 i : 1 is ! • B s u f f e r e d
similar

o those to be tried, or to remove the jurors.

22 : :1 mes

E.g.

Woolev.
D. REVERSAL IS APPROPRIATE.
The State argues that this Court should condone the
voir dire in this case because the trial court and trial counsel
had an "advantaged view, '" a .1 1 :i :i :i :i n o t seek a d d i t i o n a l voir ciii e
or challenge the similar-crimes-victim jurors for cause.

Brief

of appellee at 22, citing State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170 (Utah
App. 1992).

I

1 «n t- rami" t

the E l l i f r i t z r e c o r d , t h e o v e r a l l

voir dire in this case demonstrates that the trial court and
trial counsel failed to apply the law guaranteeing Mr. Brooks
competent

IJT"MII«

n - q u n 1111-1 t cidl

IJIJUIU-

lo insure t h e

impartiality of jurors by conducting adequate jury selection
proceedings, and requiring defense counsel to protect their
client..s'

Ljyhti

MM / selection proceedings.

•-*;.. .e the trial

court and trial counsel did have direct access to the potential
jurors, because of an apparent unawareness of the governing law,
the

.d

: --A .

*.

n o t iise t h e i r o p p o r t u n i t y

to examine the jurors as the law required.

Because the record

demonstrates that the trial court and counsel failed in their
1 ega] respons:i bi ] i ti e s cii ir 2 1 lg the v o i r d2 re, a new trial is
appropriate.
The State theorizes that the courts need not concern
themselves with

pi tint bias because Utah felony juries exceeds
11

federal standards in the number of jurors who participate in
felony juries, and that the larger number of jurors improves the
possibilities that some juror biases will be offset by other
juror biases.

The State then speculates that the biases of

jurors Pike, Heap and Geurts were likely offset by pro-defense
biases of the other five jurors.

Brief of appellee at 23-24.

There is no basis in the record for the State's theory, which is
contradicted by the verdicts.

The fact that the Utah

Constitution calls for greater protection of jury rights than
federal standards does not diminish the trial courts' duties to
insure jury rights.

The State's argument is inconsistent with

Utah case law, which law is consistent with the greater
protection afforded by the Utah Constitution, in exhorting trial
courts to exceed federal minimum standards in conducting jury
voir dire.

E.g. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991).
The State indicates its intention to ask the Utah

Supreme Court to overrule the law that it is reversible error to
force a defendant to utilize a peremptory challenge to remove a
juror who should have been removed for cause.
at 25-26.

Brief of appellee

Inasmuch as the State is not asking this Court to

address the matter, suffice it to say that peremptory challenges
are substantial rights necessary to a defendant's obtaining a
fair trial, and that the compromise of such a right properly
calls for reversal.

See e.g. State v. Young, 2 08 Utah Adv. Rep.

6, 11 (Utah 1993).
In addressing the ineffective assistance of counsel
12

a r g u m e n t , t h e S t a t e a r g u e s that trial c o u n s e l p a r t i c i p a t e d
adequately.

B r i e f o f a p p e l l e e at 2 8 . T h e s e r v i c e o f j u r o r s

B a r b e r , P i k e a n d H e a p , a n d t h e p e r e m p t o r y c h a l l e n g e of G e u r t s , i n
the a b s e n c e of e v e n a request f o r a d e q u a t e v o i r d i r e , c o n t r a d i c t s
the S t a t e ' s a r g u m e n t .

T h e State a r g u e s that trial

counse]s

f a i l u r e t o r e q u e s t v o i r d i r e of t h e j u r o r s s h o u l d b e c o n d o n e d a s
valid tactical performance because probing the jurors m a y have
a n g e r e d them and preji id i ced then i against I li : Bi ooks
a p p e l l e e at 2 9 - 3 0 .

Br d ef of

The record contradicts the State's

s p e c u l a t i o n , b e c a u s e trial counsel d i d p r o b e some of t h e j u r o r s ;
t h e r e is nothiii -

record i n d i c a t i n g that c o u n s e l w a s a c t i n g

u n d e r a n y a p p r e h e n s i o n of o f f e n d i n g t h e j u r o r s w i t h v o i r d i r e
questions.

H a d there b e e n a d a n g e r of a n g e r i n g t h e j u r o r s , trial

c o u n s e l <.. .

•. .•

request

.reside the pai lelists' p r e s e n c e

for t h e court t o conduct a d d i t i o n a l v o i r d i r e .

A n attorney

c a n n o t m a k e a v a l i d t a c t i c a l choice t o a l l o w b i a s e s r e c o g n i z e d b y
] a i/vi to g o in lii ivestigated, ,.,. : -

. m o w incompetent and

presumptively biased jurors to participate on his client's case.
See brief of appellant at 19-21.
The State argues that no plain error or ineffective
assistance of counsel occurred in the in the jury selection
process because Mr. Brooks has shown no likelihood of a more
favorable result.

Brief of appellee at 22.

Mr. Brooks is unable

to make an evidentiary assessment of prejudice stemming from the
jury selection errors because it cannot be known hew
participation of different jurors would have influenced the
13

deliberations.

When there are fundamental structural errors such

as this, prejudice should be presumed.
20-23.

See brief of appellant at

Cf. Vasauez v. Hillerv, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986)(Court

could not rely on defendant's conviction to apply harmless error
analysis to racial discrimination in the selection of the grand
jury, because Court could not determine whether the defendant
would have been indicted at all in the absence of the error in
the grand jury proceedings).

II.
THIS COURT SHOULD STRIKE THE AGGRAVATED BURGLARY CONVICTION.
Mr. Brooks is arguing that the aggravated burglary
conviction should be stricken because it did not involve a
separate act from the acts essential to the aggravated robbery
conviction, as the term act is defined by Utah Code Ann. section
76-1-601(1) (a voluntary bodily movement).
23-27.

Brief of appellant at

In response, the State argues, "The Utah Supreme Court

has squarely rejected defendant's argument that 'remaining' is
not an 'act' for the purposes of the burglary statute.

See State

v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 974, 876 (Utah 1985, amended on rehearing
1988)."

Brief of appellee at 34.

is in appendix 2 to this brief.

A copy of the Bradley decision

Nowhere in the Bradley decision

does the Utah Supreme Court address the question.
In order to convict one of aggravated burglary, the
State must prove that one entered or remained unlawfully in a
building with the intent to commit a felony with a firearm.
Code Ann. sections 76-6-202 and 203.
14
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It was the State's theory

in this case that Mr. Brooks remained unlawfully in the Vert
residence; there was no evidence that Mr. Brooks entered the Vert
residence unlawfully - - h e did so with the consent of Stephanie
Vert.

Because remaining is not a voluntary bodily movement, it

is not an act under the Utah Code jtistifyin

. separate

conviction bearing a five to life prison sentence.

Because on

the facts of this case, the jurors were not required to find that
Mr. Brooks committed any i I (

tl. aggravated burglary

conviction that was not already committed for the aggravated
robbery conviction, this Court should reverse the aggravated
robbery corn/id ion .

See Bradley.

CONCLUSION
This Coui : t: should reverse M i

• -•K_i' convictions

and order a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

day of May, 1993.

r. Brooks
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APPENDI
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions

, u I ii," 11" I, Section t\

il the Constitution of Utah provides:

Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by
jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a
jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of
four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of
the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil
cases shall be waived unless demanded.
Article VIII, Section 1 of tlle Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 1. [Judicial powers—Courts.]
The judicial power of the state shall be
vested in a supreme court, in a trial court of
general jurisdiction known as the district court,
and in such other courts as the Legislature by
statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the
district court, and such other courts designated
by statute shall be courts of record. Courts not
of record shall also be established by statute.
Amendment VI In "\ h^ Constitution ~^ *mX*~ "nited States provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.
Amendment

;ne Constitution of the United States provides:

Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge th<*
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among
the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But
when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and
Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of
the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one
years of age, and citizens of the United States,
or in any way abridged, except for participation
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or
Representative in Congress, or elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or
under any State, who, having previously taken an
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer
of the United States, or as a member of any State
legislature or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution
of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same or
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each
House, remove such disability.
Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the
United States, authorized by law, including debts
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither
the United States nor any State shall assume or
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation
of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-1-601 provides:
76-1-601. Definitions.
Unless otherwise provided, the following
terms apply to this title:
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement
and includes speech.
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal
responsibility is in issue in a criminal action.
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain,
illness, or any impairment of physical condition.
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item
capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury, or a facsimile or representation of the
item, and:
(a) the actor's use or apparent
intended use of the item leads the victim to
reasonably believe the item is likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) the actor represents to the victim
verbally or in any other manner that he is
in control of such an item.
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any
penal statute of this state.
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when
there is a legal duty to act and the actor is
capable of acting.
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or
private corporation, government, partnership, or
unincorporated association.
(9) "Possess" means to have physical
possession of or to exercise dominion or control
over tangible property.
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily
injury that creates or causes serious permanent
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of
the function of any bodily member or organ, or
creates a substantial risk of death.

Utah Code Ann, section 76-6-202 provides:
76-6-202. Burglary.
(1) a person is guilty of burglary if he
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any
portion of a building with intent to commit a
felony or theft or commit an assault on any
person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third
degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in
which event it is a felony of the second degree.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-203 provides:
76-6-203. Aggravated burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated
burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing
from a burglary the actor or another participant
in the crime:
(a) causes bodily injury to any person
who is not a participant in the crime;
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use
of a dangerous weapon against any person who
is not a participant in the crime; or
(c) possesses or attempts to use any
explosive or dangerous weapon.
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree
felony.
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous
weapon" has the same definition as under Section
76-1-601.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-302 provides:
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery*
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if
in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601; or
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree
felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act
shall be considered to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt
to commit, during the commission of, or in the
immediate flight after the attempt or commission
of a robbery.

Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-8 provides:
78-46-8. Determination on juror qualification—
Persons not competent to serve as jurors.
(1) The court, on its own initiative or
when requested by a prospective juror, shall
determine whether the prospective juror is
disqualified from jury service. The court shall
base its decision on the information provided on
the juror qualification form, or by interview
with the prospective juror or other competent
evidence. The clerk shall enter the court's
determination on the juror qualification form and
on the alphabetical list of names drawn from the
master jury wheel.
(2) The following persons are not competent
to serve as jurors:
(a) a person who has been convicted of
a felony;
(b) a person serving on active duty in
the military service of the United States;
(c) a person who is not capable because
of physical or mental disability of
rendering satisfactory jury service. Any
person who claims this disqualification may
be required to submit a physician's
certificate verifying the disability and the
certifying physician is subject to inquiry
by the court at its discretion; or
(d) a person who does not meet the
requirements of Section 78-46-7.
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-15 provides:
78-46-15. Excuse from jury service.
(1) The court, upon request of a
prospective juror or on its own initiative, shall
determine on the basis of information provided on
the juror qualification form or by interview with
the prospective juror, or by other competent
evidence, whether the prospective juror should be
excused from jury service. The clerk shall enter
this determination in the space provided on the
juror qualification form.
(2) A person may be excused from jury
service by the court, at its discretion, upon a
showing of undue hardship, extreme inconvenience,
or public necessity for any period the court
deems necessary.

Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
Rule 11. The record on appeal.
(a) Composition of the record on appeal.
The original papers and exhibits filed in the
trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if
any, the index prepared by the clerk of the trial
court, and where available the docket sheet,
shall constitute the record on appeal in all
cases. A copy of the record certified by the
clerk of the trial court to conform to the
original may be substituted for the original as
the record on appeal. Only those papers
prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall
be transmitted to the appellate court.
(b) Pagination and indexing of record.
Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal,
the clerk of the trial court shall paginate all
of the original papers and any transcript filed
in that court in chronological order and shall
prepare a chronological index of those papers.
The index shall contain a reference to the date
on which the paper was filed in the trial court
and the starting page of the record on which the
paper will be found. Clerks of the trial and
appellate courts shall establish rules and
procedures for checking out the record after
pagination for use by the parties in preparing
briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing
a petition for writ of certiorari.
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the
notice of appeal, the appellant, or in the event
that more than one appeal is taken, each
appellant, shall comply with the provisions of
paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall
take any other action necessary to enable the
clerk of the trial court to assemble and transmit
the record. A single record shall be transmitted.
(d) Papers on appeal.
(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers
in a criminal case shall be included by the
clerk of the trial court as part of the
record on appeal.
(2) Civil cases. In all civil cases,
the papers to be transmitted shall consist
of the following.
(A) Civil cases with short
records. In civil cases where all the
papers total fewer than 300 pages, all
of the papers will be transmitted to
the appellate court upon completion of
the filing of briefs. In such cases,

the appellant shall serve upon the
clerk of the trial court,
simultaneously with the filing of
appellant's reply brief, notice of the
date on which appellant's reply brief
was filed. If appellant does not
intend to file a reply brief, appellant
shall notify the clerk of the trial
court of that fact within 30 days of
the filing of appellee's brief.
(B) All other civil cases. In
all other civil cases where the papers
are or exceed 300 pages, all parties
shall file with the clerk of the trial
court, within 10 days after briefing is
completed, a joint or separate
designation of those papers referred to
in their respective briefs. Only those
designated papers and the following, to
the extent applicable, shall be
transmitted to the clerk of the
appellate court by the clerk of the
trial court:
(i) the pleadings as defined
in Rule 7(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure;
(ii) the pretrial order if
any;
(iii) the final judgment,
order, or interlocutory order from
which the appeal is taken;
(iv) other orders sought to
be reviewed, if any;
(v) any supporting opinion,
findings of fact or conclusions of
law filed or delivered by the
trial court;
(vi) the motion, response,
and accompanying memoranda upon
which the court rendered judgment,
if any;
(vii) jury instructions
given, if any;
(viii) jury verdicts and
interrogatories, if any;
(ix) the notice of appeal.
(3) Agency cases. Where all papers in
the agency record total fewer than 300
pages, the agency shall transmit all papers
to the appellate court. Where all papers in
the agency record total 300 or more pages,
the parties shall, within 10 days after

briefing is completed, file with the agency
a joint or separate designation of those
papers necessary to the appeal. The agency
shall transmit those designated papers to
the appellate court. Instead of filing all
papers or designated papers, the agency may,
with the approval of the court, file only
the chronological index of the record or of
such parts of the record as the parties may
designate. All parts of the record retained
by the agency shall be considered part of
the record on review for all purposes,
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of
appellant to order; notice to appellee if partial
transcript is ordered.
(1) Request for transcript; time for
filing. Within 10 days after filing the
notice of appeal, the appellant shall
request from the reporter a transcript of
such parts of the proceedings not already on
file as the appellant deems necessary. The
request shall be in writing, and, within the
same period, a copy shall be filed with the
clerk of the trial court and the clerk of
the appellate court. If no such parts of
the proceedings are to be requested, within
the same period the appellant shall file a
certificate to that effect with the clerk of
the trial court and a copy with the clerk of
the appellate court. If there are no
reporter but the proceedings were otherwise
recorded, the appellant shall request from a
court transcriber certified in accordance
with the rules and procedures of the
Judicial Council a transcript of such parts
of the proceeding not already on file as the
appellant deems necessary. By stipulation
of the parties approved by the appellate
court, a person other than a certified court
transcriber may transcribe a recorded
hearing. The clerk of the appellate court
shall, upon request, provide a list of all
certified court transcribers. The
transcriber is subject to all of the
obligations imposed on reporters by these
rules.
(2) Transcript required of all
evidence regarding challenged finding or
conclusion. If the appellant intends to
urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion
is unsupported by or is contrary to the
evidence, the appellant shall include in the

record a transcript of all evidence relevant
to such finding or conclusion.
(3) Statement of issues; crossdesignation by appellee. Unless the entire
transcript is to be included, the appellant
shall, within 10 days after filing the
notice of appeal, file a statement of the
issues that will be presented on appeal and
shall serve on the appellee a copy of the
request or certificate and a copy of the
statement. If the appellee deems a
transcript of other parts of the proceedings
to be necessary, the appellee shall, within
10 days after the service of the request or
certificate and the statement of the
appellant, file and serve on the appellant a
designation of additional parts to be
included. Unless within 10 days after
service of such designation the appellant
has requested such parts and has so notified
the appellee, the appellee may within the
following 10 days either request the parts
or move in the trial court for an order
requiring the appellant to do so.
(4) Payment of reporter.
At the time
of the request, a party shall make
satisfactory arrangements with the reporter
or transcriber for payment of the cost of
the transcript.
(f) Agreed statement as the record on
appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal as
defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the
parties may prepare and sign a statement of the
case, showing how the issues presented by the
appeal arose and were decided in the trial court
and setting forth only so many of the facts
averred and proved or sought to be proved as are
essential to a decision of the issues presented.
If the statement conforms to the truth, it,
together with such additions as the trial court
may consider necessary fully to present the
issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved by
the trial court. The clerk of the trial court
shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the
appellate court within the time prescribed by
Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court
shall transmit the index of the record to the
clerk of the appellate court upon approval of the
statement by the trial court.

(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings
when no report was made or when transcript is
unavailable. If no report of the evidence or
proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if
a transcript is unavailable, the appellant may
prepare a statement of the evidence or
proceedings from the best available means,
including recollection. The statement shall be
served on the appellee, who may serve objections
or propose amendments within 10 days after
service. The statement and any objections or
proposed amendments shall be submitted to the
trial court for settlement and approval and, as
settled and approved, shall be included by the
clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal.
(h) Correction or modification of the
record. If any difference arises as to whether
the record truly discloses what occurred in the
trial court, the difference shall be submitted to
and settled by that court and the record made to
conform to the truth. If anything material to
either party is omitted from the record by error
or accident or is misstated, the parties by
stipulation, the trial court, or the appellate
court, either before or after the record is
transmitted, may direct that the omission or
misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a
supplemental record be certified and
transmitted. The moving party, or the court if
it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve
on the parties a statement of the proposed
changes. Within 10 days after service, any party
may serve objections to the proposed changes.
All other questions as to the form and content of
the record shall be presented to the appellate
court. (Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 25, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
Rule 25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian
ad litem.
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian
ad litem representing a minor who is not a party
to the appeal may be filed only if accompanied by
written consent of all parties, or by leave of
court granted on motion or at the request of the
court. A motion for leave shall identify the
interest of the applicant and shall state the
reasons why a brief of an amicus curiae or the
guardian ad litem is desirable. Except as all
parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae or

guardian ad litem shall file its brief within the
time allowed the party whose position as to
affirmance or reversal the amicus curiae or
guardian ad litem will support, unless the court
for cause shown otherwise orders. A motion of an
amicus curiae or guardian ad litem to participate
in the oral argument will be granted when
circumstances warrant in the court's discretion.
Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Rule 18. Selection of jury.
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call
the number of the jurors that are to try the
cause plus such an additional number as will
allow for all peremptory challenges permitted.
After each challenge for cause sustained, another
juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before
further challenges are made, and any such new
juror may be challenged for cause. When the
challenges for cause are completed, the clerk
shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and
each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall
indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one
juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may
direct, until all peremptory challenges are
exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call
the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall
be necessary to constitute the jury, in the order
in which they appear on the list, and the persons
whose names are so called shall constitute the
jury.
(b) The court may permit counsel or the
defendant to conduct the examination of the
prospective jurors or may itself conduct the
examination. In the latter event, the court may
permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the
examination by such further inquiry as it deems
proper, or may itself submit to the prospective
jurors additional questions requested by counsel
or the defendant.
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or
to an individual juror.
(1) The panel is a list of jurors
called to serve at a particular court or for
the trial of a particular action. A
challenge to the panel is an objection made
to all jurors summoned and may be taken by
either party.

(i) A challenge to the panel can
be founded only on a material departure
from the procedure prescribed with
respect to the selection, drawing,
summoning and return of the panel.
(ii) The challenge to the panel
shall be taken before the jury is sworn
and shall be in writing or recorded by
the reporter. It shall specifically
set forth the facts constituting the
grounds of the challenge.
(iii) If a challenge to the panel
is opposed by the adverse party, a
hearing may be had to try any question
of fact upon which the challenge is
based. The jurors challenged, and any
other persons, may be called as
witnesses at the hearing thereon.
(iv) The court shall decide the
challenge. If the challenge to the
panel is allowed, the court shall
discharge the jury so far as the trial
in question is concerned. If a
challenge is denied, the court shall
direct the selection of jurors to
proceed.
(2) A challenge to an individual juror
may be either peremptory or for cause. A
challenge to an individual juror may be made
only before the jury is sworn to try the
action, except the court may, for good
cause, permit it to be made after the juror
is sworn but before any of the evidence is
presented. In challenges for cause the
rules relating to challenges to a panel and
hearings thereon shall apply. All
challenges for cause shall be taken first by
the prosecution and then by the defense.
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection
to a juror for which no reason need be given. In
capital cases, each side is entitled to 10
peremptory challenges. In other felony cases
each side is entitled to four peremptory
challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is
entitled to three peremptory challenges. If
there is more than one defendant the court may
allow the defendants additional peremptory
challenges and permit them to be exercised
separately or jointly.
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection
to a particular juror and may be taken on one or
more of the following grounds:

(1) want of any of the qualifications
prescribed by law;
(2) any mental or physical infirmity
which renders one incapable of performing
the duties of a juror;
(3) consanguinity or affinity within
the fourth degree to the person alleged to
be injured by the offense charged, or on
whose complaint the prosecution was
instituted;
(4) the existence of any social, legal,
business, fiduciary or other relationship
between the prospective juror and any party,
witness or person alleged to have been
victimized or injured by the defendant,
which relationship when viewed objectively,
would suggest to reasonable minds that the
prospective juror would be unable or
unwilling to return a verdict which would be
free of favoritism. A prospective juror
shall not be disqualified solely because he
is indebted to or employed by the state or a
political subdivision thereof;
(5) having been or being the party
adverse to the defendant in a civil action,
or having complained against or having been
accused by him in a criminal prosecution;
(6) having served on the grand jury
which found the indictment;
(7) having served on a trial jury which
has tried another person for the particular
offense charged;
(8) having been one of a jury formally
sworn to try the same charge, and whose
verdict was set aside, or which was
discharged without a verdict after the case
was submitted to it;
(9) having served as a juror in a civil
action brought against the defendant for the
act charged as an offense;
(10) if the offense charged is
punishable with death, the entertaining of
such conscientious opinions about the death
penalty as would preclude the juror from
voting to impose the death penalty following
conviction regardless of the facts;
(11) because he is or, within one year
preceding, has been engaged or interested in
carrying on any business, calling or
employment, the carrying on of which is a
violation of law, where defendant is charged
with a like offense;

(12) because he has been a witness,
whether for or against the defendant on the
preliminary examination or before the grand
jury;
(13) having formed or expressed an
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether
the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the
offense charged; or
(14) that a state of mind exists on the
part of the juror with reference to the
cause, or to either party, which will
prevent him from acting impartially and
without prejudice to the substantial rights
of the party challenging; but no person
shall be disqualified as a juror by reason
of having formed or expressed an opinion
upon the matter or cause to be submitted to
such jury, founded upon public rumor,
statements in public journals or common
notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to
the court that the juror can and will,
notwithstanding such opinion, act
impartially and fairly upon the matter to be
submitted to him.
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken
first by the prosecution and then by the defense
alternately. Challenges for cause shall be
completed before peremptory challenges are taken.
(g) The court may direct that alternate
jurors be impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the
order in which they are called, shall replace
jurors who are, or become, unable or disqualified
to perform their duties. The prosecution and
defense shall each have one additional peremptory
challenge for each alternate juror to be chosen.
Alternate jurors shall have the same
qualifications, take the same oath and enjoy the
same privileges as regular jurors.
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a
juror is a privilege of the person exempted and
is not a ground for challenge for cause.
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall
be administered to the jurors, in substance, that
they and each of them will well and truly try the
matter in issue between the parties, and render a
true verdict according to the evidence and the
instructions of the court.

Rule 606, Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Rule 606. Competency of juror as witness.
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may
not testify as a witness before that jury in the
trial of the case in which the juror is sitting.
If the juror is called so to testify, the
opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity
to object out of the presence of the jury.
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or
indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of
a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify
as to any matter or statement occurring during
the course of the jury's deliberations or to the
effect of anything upon that or any other juror's
mind or emotions as influencing the juror to
assent to or dissent from the verdict or
indictment or concerning the juror's mental
processes in connection therewith, except that a
juror may testify on the question whether
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention or whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear
upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or
evidence of any statement by the juror concerning
a matter about which the juror would be precluded
from testifying be received for these purposes.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
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Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F.
Wilkinson, J., of aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and tampering with a
witness, and he appealed. The Supreme
Court held that (1) conviction of tampering with witness would be sustained on
evidence indicating that defendant wanted
to stop victim from involving herself with
any official proceeding or litigation defendant believed was underway, and on rehearing, held that (2) aggravated assault was
lesser included offense of aggravated burglary, on instructions given and evidence
presented, and assault conviction would
thus be reversed.
Reversed in part and otherwise affirmed.
1. Assault and Battery <s=>54t 71
Offense of aggravated assault amounted to an attempt, with unlawful force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another, or a
threat of bodily injury to another accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence and was established as against defendant notwithstanding that it was defendant's companion and not defendant
who held weapon to victim during incident
giving rise to offense. U.C.A.1953, 76-2202, 76-S-102.
2. Burglary e=»15
Consent manifested by victim when he
opened door to defendant, who he believed
had come to his house for lawful purpose,
was limited to that purpose and did not, in

context of charge of aggravated burglary
authorize defendant to order victim out of
house at gunpoint U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202.
3. Burglary <s=>15
A consent to enter limited as to place,
time, or purpose is not a defense to burglary where entry occurs outside limitation*
stated or implied. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202.
4. Burglary <s=»41(4)
Element of unlawful entry was established with respect to crime of aggravated
burglary on evidence indicating that defendant entered or remained unlawfully in
victim's home with intent to commit an
assault U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202.
5. Obstructing Justice <s=>4
Crime of tampering with a witness requires no more than that a defendant believe an official proceeding or investigation
to be underway. U.C.A.1953, 76-8-508.
6. Obstructing Justice G=*16
Conviction of tampering with witness
was sustained on evidence indicating that
defendant wanted to stop victim from involving herself with any official proceeding
or litigation he believed was underway.
U.C.A.1953, 76-8-508.
7. Criminal Law <£»29
When a defendant has improperly been
convicted of both the greater and the included offense, the conviction on the included offense is treated as mere surplusage,
and the conviction of the greater offense
remains unaffected.
On Petition For Rehearing
8. Indictment and Information e=>191(2)
As theoretical proposition, defendant
could commit aggravated burglary without
committing aggravated assault, as aggravated burglary may require no more than
that burglar be armed with deadly weapon
and being armed with deadly weapon
would not, in and of itself, amount to assault, but when element that burglar uses
or threatens immediate use of dangerous
or deadly weapon against any person who
is not participant in crime is relied upon by
prosecution to prove aggravated burglary,
aggravated assault is simultaneously prov-
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en, for purposes of determining whether
aggravated assault is lesser included offense of aggravated burglary. U.C.A.
1953, 76-5-103(lXb), 76-6-203(b, c).
9. Indictment and Information e=>191(2)
Aggravated assault was lesser included offense of aggravated burglary in prosecution in which defendant was convicted
of both offenses, and reversal of assault
conviction was accordingly required; instructions on aggravated burglary included
element that defendant used or threatened
immediate use of dangerous or deadly
weapon against any person, and comparing
instructions on aggravated burglary and
aggravated assault, jury did not have to
find any additional elements for conviction
of aggravated assault beyond elements of
crime of aggravated burglary, evidence
was that defendant, with two companions,
entered victim's home at victim's invitation,
and that one of the companions pulled victim's shotgun from rack on the wall, drew
pistol from his waist, and pointed it at
victim's head. U.CA.1953, 76-5-103(l)(b),
76-6~203(b).
John C- Green, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and respondent
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Kenneth Dee Bradley was
convicted by a jury of aggravated assault,
a third degree felony in violation of U.C.A.
§ 76-5-103 (1978 ed.), aggravated burglary, a first degree felony in violation of
section 76-6-203, and tampering with a witness, a third degree felony in violation of
section 76-8-508. He appeals from all
three convictions claiming that the evidence
adduced at trial failed as a matter of law to
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that he cannot be convicted of
both a lesser offense and a greater offense.
We reverse in part and affirm in part
During her separation from her husband
Bill, Gina Rider dated Tom Bettwieser who
bad been investigated for theft of funds
belonging to a partnership in which defend-

ant and Tom Adams were partners and
Bettwieser was an employee. Defendant
was also a suspect in the theft On the day
of the theft, Bettwieser informed Gina that
he had committed the theft In the course
of the investigation of the partnership,
Gina was contacted by law enforcement
officials, was subpoenaed as a witness, and
was involved with Tom Adams' private investigation of the theft
On December 24, 1982, Bettwieser arranged for Gina and her two children to
move into a house managed by defendant
at 11th East and 17th South in Salt Lake
City. Bill and Gina Rider reconciled, and
with defendant's approval, Bill moved into
the house a day later with the understanding that in lieu of rent, the Riders
would pay the utilities for the house and an
attached locksmith shop. On the day Rider
moved in, he and Gina had an argument in
which defendant intervened. Rider threatened defendant and his stepson with a
sawed-off shotgun, but later everybody
apologized, and the Riders continued to occupy the home.
In the afternoon of January 27, 1983,
defendant, "Spider" Wissink, and "Bett"
Bettwieser, Tom Bettwieser's younger
brother, drove to the Riders' home. The
Riders, their two small children, and Gina's
eighteen-year-old sister were at home.
Rider was expecting defendant because he
needed his signature on some social security papers. He opened the door for defendant, telling Gina that defendant was there.
The three men entered, and Spider pulled
Rider's shotgun from a rack on the wall,
drew a pistol from his waist, and pointed it
at Rider's head. He turned to defendant
and asked, "What do you want me to do,
boss? Do you want me to break some
bones or blow them away?" Defendant
answered that he thought the matter could
be settled without violence. He then informed Gina that he was tired of her involvement with Tom Adams, that she had
been talking too much and he wanted it
stopped, and that he would "just as soon
blow you away as look at you if it gets to
i t " The Riders' four-year-old girl became
frightened and started screaming. Spider
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told her that he did not want to hurt her
daddy and that he was just doing his job.
Defendant, at that point, ordered the Riders out of the house. Spider took Rider at
gunpoint through the rooms to gather his
belongings. When the Riders refused to
use defendant's truck to move, he left and
said he would be back at the end of the
day. Rider called the police, who escorted
the family out of the home.
At the end of the state's case in chief,
defendant moved to dismiss the charges
against him for the State's failure to meet
its burden of proof. That motion was denied In this appeal, defendant challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
verdict of guilty on all three charges. We
view the evidence in a light most favorable
to the jury verdict and do not disturb the
jury verdict unless the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable
man could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt State v.
McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982). We
apply that same standard to those facts
that can be reasonably inferred from the
evidence presented at trial. State v. Griffin, 685 P.2d 546 (Utah 1984).
I.
[1] In support of his claim that the evidence adduced at trial failed as a matter of
law to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the charge of aggravated
assault, defendant contends that the statute interdicts the use of "a deadly weapon
or such means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily harm." Defendant
takes the position that it was Spider and
not he who held the weapon and that the
State entirely failed to prove assault
against him. The trial court properly instructed the jury on aggravated assault
and on assault as an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another, or a threat of bodily injury to
another accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence. U.C.A. §§ 76-5-102
and 103 (1978 e&). It also instructed the
jury that defendant could be held criminally liable for the conduct of another, as
defined in section 76-2-202. See also
State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983).

The evidence delineated above was sufficiently substantial for the jury to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault
[2-4] Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the conviction of
aggravated burglary is grounded inter
alia in his claim that he did not enter the
Rider premises unlawfully, and thus a crucial element of the crime of burglary was
not established. Defendant overlooks the
fact that a person is guilty of burglary "if
he enters or remains unlawfully in a building . . . with intent to commit . . . an assault on any person." U.C.A. § 76-6-202
(1978) (emphasis added). In State v.
Brown, 6 Kan.App.2d 556, 630 P.2d 731
(1981), the court, in defining a statute similar to Utah's, K.S.A. 21-3716, stated that
"remaining within refers to the situation
where defendant's initial entry is authorized, but at some later time that person's
presence becomes unauthorized." Id 630
P.2d at 735. Although it is true that Rider
opened the door to defendant whom he
expected to come to his house for a lawful
purpose, his consent to defendant's entry
was limited to that purpose and did not
authorize defendant to order Rider out of
the house at gunpoint "[A] consent limited as to place, time, or purpose is not a
defense where entry occurs outside the
limitation stated or implied." State v.
Keys, 244 Or. 606, 419 P.2d 943, 946 (1966)
(citations omitted). See also State v.
Pierce, 14 Utah 2d 177, 380 P.2d 725 (1963)
(no consent where entry obtained through
deception). The jury was well within its
province in finding that defendant entered
or remained unlawfully in the Rider home
with the intent to commit an assault Defendant's remaining point, that the jury
was not instructed that defendant was an
accomplice, is contradicted by the record as
stated above.
[5,6] Defendant next contends that the
state failed to put on any credible evidence
of a pending official proceeding or investigation to convict him of tampering with a
witness. That argument is based on a
faulty premise. The statute requires no
more than that a defendant believe an offi-
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cial proceeding or investigation to be underway. The jury was properly instructed
on the elements set out in section 76-S-508.
The Riders reported to the police officer on
the day of the assault that defendant was
angry because Gina had been talking to
Tom Adams. It was for the jury to decide
whether any credible inference could be
drawn from that testimony that defendant
wanted to stop Gina from involving herself
with any official proceeding or investigation he believed was underway. The existence of contradictory evidence or conflicting inferences does not warrant disturbing
the jury's verdict State v. Howell, 649
P.2d 91 (Utah 1982).
II.
Finally, defendant claims that he cannot
be convicted of both aggravated assault
and aggravated burglary, because under
the facts of this case, the greater crime is
that of aggravated assault which is the
basis of the lesser crime of aggravated
burglary. In support he cites State v. Hill,
Utah, 674 P.2d 96, 97 (1983), where this
Court stated that "where the two crimes
are 'such that the greater cannot be committed without necessarily having committed the lesser,' State v. Baker, Utah, 671
P.2d 152, 155 (1983), then as a matter of
law they stand in the relationship of greater and lesser offenses, and the defendant
cannot be convicted or punished for both."
See also U.C-A. § 76-1-402(3) (1978 ed.).
Aggravated assault is a felony of the
third degree, whereas aggravated burglary
is a felony of the first degree, and thus we
need to determine whether defendant could
have committed the aggravated burglary
without necessarily having committed the
aggravated assault1
In State v. Hill, supra, we stated that a
secondary test was required where the
crimes standing in a greater-lesser relationship have multiple variations. We must
therefore consider the evidence to determine whether that relationship existed between the specific variations of the crimes
actually proved at the defendant's trial.
1. Defendant inadvertently reverses the order of

[7] The elements of aggravated burglary proved at trial were that defendant (1)
entered or remained unlawfully in the Riders' home (2) with the intent to commit an
assault and that he (3) threatened immediate use of a deadly weapon. The elements
of aggravated assault proved at trial were
that defendant either (a) attempted with
unlawful force or violence to do bodily injury to another; or (b) made a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c) carried out the attempt or threat by use
of a deadly weapon. As can be seen, the
elements of assault set out in (a) or (b)
above are contained in (2) above (intent to
commit assault), while the elements set out
in (c), defining aggravated assault, are also
contained in (3) above, defining aggravated
burglary. Under the facts of this case,
defendant should not have been convicted
of aggravated assault as well as of aggravated burglaiy. § 76-1-402(3). As we
stated in State v. Hill, supra, when a defendant has been improperly convicted of
both the greater and the included offense,
the conviction on the included offense is
treated as mere surplusage and the conviction of the greater offense remains unaffected.
The conviction of aggravated assault is
reversed and the sentence thereon vacated.
In all other respects, the judgment on the
verdict is affirmed.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
We granted rehearing to consider the
State's argument that the aggravated burglary statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203
(1978), on its face does not require proof of
the acts which make up the target offense
of aggravated assault All that is required
by that statute, according to the State, is
proof that a defendant intended to commit
the target offense. Consequently, continues its argument, aggravated assault requires proof of more than all the facts
required for proof of aggravated burglary,
and defendant could have committed aggravated burglary without necessarily having committed aggravated assault We
the offenses.
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have reviewed our decision on the reversal
of defendant's conviction of aggravated assault because it stood in the relationship of
a lesser and included offense of aggravated
burglary, of which he was also convicted.
We have decided, under the narrow factual
circumstances of this case, that the reversal should stand, for the following reasons:

sault, it is apparent that the jury did not
have to find any additional elements for
conviction of that crime beyond the elements of the crime of aggravated burglary.
Instruction No. 13 on aggravated assault
required the jury to find each and every
one of the following elements: (1) that
defendant assaulted Bill and Gina Rider;
[8] As a theoretical proposition, a de- (2) that defendant then and there used a
fendant could commit an aggravated bur- deadly weapon or such means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury;
glary without committing an aggravated
and (3) that defendant did so intentionally
assault Aggravated burglary may require
or knowingly or recklessly.
no more than that the burglar be "armed
In this case, the State's evidence was
with a deadly weapon." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-203(c). Being armed with a deadly that defendant with two companions enweapon in and of itself would not amount tered Rider's home at Rider's invitation.
to an assault However, aggravated bur- One of the companions ("Spider") pulled
glary may also be accomplished when the Rider's shotgun from a rack on the wall,
burglar "uses or threatens the immediate drew a pistol from his waist, and pointed it
use of a dangerous or deadly weapon at Rider's head.
against any person who is not a participant
Since the jury was not required to find
in the crime."
Utah Code Ann. any additional elements to convict defend§ 76-6-203(b). When that element is relied ant of aggravated assault once it had found
upon by the prosecution to prove aggrava- him guilty of aggravated burglary, we corted burglary, aggravated assault is simul- rectly affirmed the conviction of aggravataneously proven.
Utah Code Ann. ted burglary, a first degree felony, and
§ 76-5-103(lXb).
vacated the conviction of aggravated assault,
a third degree felony, as being sur[9] In the instant case, instructions givplusage.
As we observed in our earlier
en to the jury on aggravated burglary
adopted the latter alternative, namely, that opinion in this case, "where the two crimes
defendant "use[d] or threatened] the im- are such that the greater cannot be commediate use of a dangerous or deadly mitted without necessarily having commitweapon against any person." (This alter- ted the lesser, then as a matter of law they
native was also employed in the charging stand in the relationship of greater and
information against defendant) Instruc- lesser offenses, and the defendant cannot
tion No. 16 directed the jury to find all of be convicted or punished for both." State
the following elements before it could con- v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983); State v.
vict defendant of aggravated burglary: (1) Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983).
This result leaves defendant convicted of
that defendant entered or remained in the
building of Bill and Gina Rider; (2) that he one first degree felony. As explained
did so unlawfully; (3) that he did so inten- above, an information charging defendant
tionally, knowingly, or recklessly, (4) that with being armed with a deadly weapon
he did so with the intent to commit a felo- under the count of aggravated burglary
ny, a theft, or an assault on Bill Rider or would have also subjected him to a convicGina Rider; and (5) that in attempting, tion of aggravated assault, a third degree
committing, or fleeing from said burglary, felony. Likewise, the State could have
defendant or another participant in the charged defendant with simple burglary, a
crime used or threatened the immediate second degree felony, which requires only
use of a dangerous or deadly weapon an intent to commit an assault or felony,
against the Riders. When that instruction and with aggravated assault, a third deis compared to instruction No. 13, which gree felony, which requires an actual asdefined the elements of aggravated as- sault with a weapon. Under either of
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those scenarios, defendant would have
been properly convicted of both offenses.
Under the actual charges in this case, aggravated assault constituted a lesser and
included offense of aggravated burglary.
Our decision thus stands.
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Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E.
Conder, J., of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, and defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court, Hall, CJ., held that
(1) court did not err in refusing to give
requested cautionary instruction regarding
reliability of eyewitness identification; (2)
defendant waived right to relief for prosecutor's failure to disclose defendant's statements made to arresting officer, (3) reversible error was not committed by admitting
testimony of witness which revealed existence of outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest; and (4) testimony regarding
significant change in defendant's appearance did not constitute error.
Affirmed.

L Criminal Law s=>785(l)
Decision whether to caution jury regarding reliability of eyewitness identification is matter within sound discretion of
trial court

2. Criminal Law <s=>829(16)
Court did not err in failing to give
cautionary instruction regarding reliability
of eyewitness identification, where defendant was identified as robber by each of his
victims, victims' testimony was corroborated by compelling direct and circumstantial evidence of defendant's identity as robber, and court appropriately instructed jury
on elements of offenses charged, prosecution's burden of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, and role of jury in assessing credibility of witnesses, which covered the same
substance.
3. Criminal Law <s»412(4)
Defendant was not entitled to mistrial
for State's failure to disclose to defendant
until shortly before trial his statements
made to arresting officer, where defendant
did not move for continuance to which he
would have been entitled; defendant
waived right to relief by not making timely
efforts to mitigate or eliminate prejudice
caused by prosecutor's misconduct U.C.A.
1953, 77-35-16(g).
4. Criminal Law $=»1169.11
Reversible error was not committed by
admission of witness' testimony which revealed existence of outstanding warrant
for defendant's arrest in another unrelated
matter, where witness' reference to warrant was very brief and only made in passing, testimony did not give details of circumstances which caused warrant to issue
or of offense to which it was related, and
court admonished jury to disregard testimony.
5. Criminal Law e=>374
Court did not err in allowing witness to
testify in robbery prosecution about significant change in defendant's appearance between time she saw him in store and time
he appeared for lineup despite defendant's
contention that testimony would leave impression that witness had been defendant's
robbery victim in unrelated case, where
court did not allow witness to describe circumstances of her encounter with defendant, and only by conjecture could conclusion be reached that witness had also been
victim of defendant

